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                                                            ____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
 This interlocutory appeal about compelled arbitration arises out of a broader 
dispute regarding Mercedes BlueTEC diesel vehicles.  That wider controversy involves a 
putative class action of individual buyers who purchased Mercedes BlueTEC diesel 
vehicles from Mercedes dealerships, believing that those vehicles were ‘clean diesel’ 
when allegedly they were not.  From those allegations, 60 named plaintiffs bring an array 
of claims as a nationwide class for violations of federal law and as thirty-three subclasses 
for violations of various state laws.  Those claims are directed not against the dealerships 
but rather against two manufacturers, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Daimler AG, as 
well as their software suppliers.  The two manufacturer defendants, the ‘Mercedes 
Manufacturers,’ moved to dismiss the initial complaint, and that led to several cycles of 
amended complaints and subsequent motions to dismiss.   
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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The Mercedes Manufacturers take this appeal from the District Court’s partial 
denial of their motion to dismiss the Fourth Consolidated and Amended Class Action 
Complaint.  Although that motion presented numerous bases for dismissal, only one of 
those – the request to compel arbitration – is at issue in this interlocutory appeal.  That 
request to compel arbitration relates to two named plaintiffs, Gwendolyn Andary and 
Darrell Feller, who purchased vehicles from Mercedes dealerships, one located in 
California, the other in Virginia.  In seeking to compel arbitration, the Mercedes 
Manufacturers rely on the terms of the purchase agreements between those dealerships 
and Andary and Feller.  But those purchase agreements do not mention the Mercedes 
Manufacturers, nor are the Mercedes Manufacturers signatories to those agreements.  On 
the briefing before it, the District Court rejected the argument that the purchase 
agreements compelled Andary and Feller to arbitrate with the Mercedes Manufacturers 
directly or as third-party beneficiaries.  The Mercedes Manufacturers noticed an 
interlocutory appeal as permitted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  See 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(C).   
Neither side appears content with the record for this interlocutory appeal.  For the 
first time on appeal, the Mercedes Manufacturers raise a ‘gateway’ arbitrability defense.  
Meanwhile, Andary, Feller, and the other named plaintiffs have augmented the District 
Court docket during the pendency of this appeal.  Andary and Feller filed a joint notice of 
voluntary dismissal under Civil Rule 41 in an attempt to dismiss themselves, without 
prejudice, as named plaintiffs.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).  Shortly afterwards, the 
remaining named plaintiffs filed a Fifth Consolidated and Amended Class Action 
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Complaint, which did not include either Andary or Feller as a named plaintiff.  That 
amended pleading did, however, define the putative nationwide class and two subclasses 
such that Andary and Feller would be included as class members.  Based upon those 
filings, Andary and Feller moved to dismiss this appeal as moot, even though they remain 
as putative class members under the most recent amended complaint.  
From this unusually fluid posture, two central issues emerge on appeal.  First is the 
question of whether this appeal is moot.  Second is the issue of whether the District Court 
erred in not compelling Andary or Feller to arbitrate with the Mercedes Manufacturers.  
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that this appeal is not moot, and we will vacate 
the District Court’s order in part and remand for the District Court to evaluate the 
Mercedes Manufacturers’ motion to compel arbitration on state-law grounds.   
I 
 The post-appeal filings in the District Court do not moot this appeal.  Once the 
Mercedes Manufacturers noticed this appeal, jurisdiction over Andary’s and Feller’s 
claims was divested from the District Court and vested in this court.  See Griggs v. 
Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (“The filing of a notice of appeal 
is an event of jurisdictional significance – it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals 
and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the 
appeal.”); see also Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mort. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 158 
(3d Cir. 1998) (“[J]urisdiction that is originally and properly vested in the district court 
becomes vested in the court of appeals when a notice of appeal is filed.”); Venen v. 
Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1985).  Because the District Court did not retain 
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jurisdiction over Andary’s and Feller’s claims, their suit could not be altered through 
operation of the Civil Rules during the pendency of this appeal.  See generally Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 1 (providing that the Civil Rules “govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts” (emphasis added)); cf. Fed. R. App. 
P. 42 (providing for the voluntary dismissal of an appeal).  But both the notice of 
voluntary dismissal and the Fifth Consolidated and Amended Class Action Complaint 
were filed in the District Court while this appeal was pending.  Because the District Court 
did not have jurisdiction over Andary and Feller’s suit at those times, neither filing moots 
this appeal.   
Without mootness as a bar, this court has jurisdiction over this appeal.  The 
District Court had jurisdiction over the federal causes of action, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as 
well as the related state-law causes of action, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367.  And under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, this court has jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of the 
District Court’s denial of the Mercedes Manufacturers’ motion to compel arbitration.  See 
9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C).   
II 
The remainder of this appeal focuses on whether the District Court erred by not 
compelling Andary and Feller to arbitrate with the Mercedes Manufacturers.  According 
to the Mercedes Manufacturers, the purchase agreements between the dealerships and 
Andary and Feller require arbitration with the Mercedes Manufacturers.  But the 
Mercedes Manufacturers were not signatories to those purchase agreements.  And the 
purchase agreements require arbitration only with the dealerships or specific categories of 
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other entities, such as the dealerships’ “employees, agents, successors or assigns.”  The 
Mercedes Manufacturers do not contend that they qualify as an employee, agent, 
successor, or assign of either dealership.  Rather, as non-signatories without any express 
mention in the arbitration clauses, they invoke three legal theories on appeal to compel 
arbitration: (i) a ‘gateway’ arbitrability defense; (ii) equitable estoppel; and (iii) a third-
party beneficiary theory.  But the first of those arguments – ‘gateway’ arbitrability – was 
not raised before the District Court and has been forfeited.  See United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012) (considering an argument not raised below as forfeited); 
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We 
generally refuse to consider issues that the parties have not raised below.”).  The 
remaining two issues have not been forfeited because the District Courted analyzed a 
third-party beneficiary theory that implicated principles of equitable estoppel.   
In evaluating those two arguments, it is necessary at the outset to identify the 
applicable substantive law.  Traditional principles of state law govern arbitration clauses, 
but it is not clear which state’s substantive law should apply here.  See Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630-31 (2009) (looking to state law to determine whether 
an arbitration clause is enforceable with respect to a third party); see also In re Remicade 
(Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 515, 519-22 (3d Cir. 2019); Aliments Krispy 
Kernels, Inc. v. Nichols Farms, 851 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2017).  The lawsuit was filed 
in New Jersey, yet Andary is a California resident who purchased her car in California, 
and Feller is a Washington state resident who purchased his car in Virginia.  Andary’s 
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purchase agreement indicates that federal law and California law apply, while Feller’s 
purchase agreement has no provision regarding applicable law.   
From these facts, a choice-of-law analysis is needed to resolve the question of 
which state substantive law governs the construction of these arbitration clauses.  See 
Aliments Krispy Kernels, 851 F.3d at 289 (“Because we look to applicable state law to 
determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we begin with a choice-of-law 
analysis.”); White v. Sunoco, Inc., 870 F.3d 257, 263 (3d Cir. 2017).  But in advancing 
their arguments on compelled arbitration, the parties have not provided any choice-of-law 
analysis on appeal.  Nor did the District Court conduct such an analysis.  
That is a problem: without a choice-of-law analysis and subsequent application of 
the appropriate state substantive law, it cannot be conclusively determined whether 
Andary’s and Feller’s purchase agreements compel them to arbitrate with the Mercedes 
Manufacturers.  The choice-of-law analysis should have been performed by the District 
Court.  See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, 
that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”); 
Freeman, 709 F.3d at 249 (“We generally refuse to consider issues that the parties have 
not raised below.”); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 
(1956) (stating in dicta that remand is appropriate when there is a “question in doubt or 
deserving further canvass” regarding state law governing an arbitration clause).  
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand this matter to the 
District Court for consideration of the Mercedes Manufacturers’ third-party beneficiary 
and equitable estoppel arguments under applicable state law.   
